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NOTES
SILENCING THE MINORITY: THE PRACTICAL
EFFECTS OF ARKANSAS EDUCATIONAL
TELEVISION COMMISSION V. FORBES
Francis J. Ortman, III
Chief Justice Earl Warren, writing the opinion of the Supreme Court
in Sweezy v. New Hampshire,1 noted that "[h]istory has amply proved the
virtue of political activity by minority, dissident groups, who innumerable
times have been the vanguard of democratic thought and whose pro-
grams were ultimately accepted .... The absence of such voices would
be a symptom of grave illness in our society."2 Nevertheless, the Su-
preme Court's decision in Arkansas Educational Television Commission
v. Forbes3 signals that subjective, ad hoc decisions of state employees can
4silence such vanguard, dissident voices.
The First Amendment's promise of freedom of speech5 has produced
many struggles involving the ability of the government to establish limits
relating to how,' where,' and in some cases, what8 a speaker may say.
One of the most enduring difficulties for the Court has been determining
'J.D. candidate, May 2000, The Catholic University of America, Columbus School of Law.
1. 354 U.S. 234 (1957).
2. Id. at 251.
3. 523 U.S. 666 (1998).
4. See id. at 683 (holding that a public broadcaster's decision to exclude a controver-
sial candidate from a television debate was a reasonable and viewpoint-neutral exercise of
journalistic discretion).
5. U.S. CONST. amend. I ("Congress shall make no law.., abridging the freedom of
speech").
6. See, e.g., Clark v. Community for Creative Non-Violence, 468 U.S. 288, 293, 296
(1984) (holding that the National Park Service could deny homeless protesters the right to
sleep on the National Mall because Park Service regulations against camping were nar-
rowly tailored and left open alternative means for the group to convey their message).
7. See, e.g., Greer v. Spock, 424 U.S. 828, 836, 838 (1976) (holding that the military
could prohibit a presidential candidate from giving a speech on a military base even
though the base is open to the public).
8. See, e.g., New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747, 758, 773-74 (1982) (upholding the
conviction of a seller of child pornography on the basis that the protection of children pro-
vided by a statute prohibiting production and distribution of this type of material out-
weighs child pornographers' freedom of speech).
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where and when the government may restrict a speaker's access to a par-
ticular forum.9
From this endeavor, the Court has defined three types of fora: the tra-
ditional public forum, the designated or limited public forum, and the
nonpublic forum.10 For each, the Court has also established standards for
access.1' The traditional public forum includes public streets and parks,
areas where property has been "held in trust for the use of the public and
... [has] been used for purposes of assembly, communicating thoughts
between citizens, and discussing public questions.' ' 12 A designated public
forum exists when the government establishes an area that has not tradi-
tionally been a forum for expressive activity to all or part of the public
for speech purposes. 3 The Court has also held that a designated public
forum can "be created for a limited purpose such as use by certain
groups.' '14 If the state wishes to exclude a speaker from the traditional
public forum or a forum that is designated for speech purposes, the state
must demonstrate that the exclusion serves a compelling state interest
and that the regulation of speech is narrowly tailored to serve that inter-
est. 5 In the nonpublic forum, however, an area that has not by tradition
or designation been open to speech, the state may regulate speech as
long as the regulation is reasonable and does not constitute an attempt to
9. See generally Cornelius v. NAACP Legal Defense & Educ. Fund, Inc., 473 U.S.
788, 805-06, 813 (1985) (allowing the exclusion of various groups from a federal charity
campaign because that type of forum is not characteristic of property used for expressive
purposes and was, therefore, a nonpublic forum); Perry Educ. Ass'n v. Perry Local Educa-
tors' Ass'n, 460 U.S. 37, 47, 55 (1983) (permitting a school to restrict access to a teachers'
mail system because it was a nonpublic forum); Widmar v. Vincent, 454 U.S. 263, 277
(1981) (holding that a university created a public forum by opening up its facilities to stu-
dent groups).
10. See Perry, 460 U.S. at 45-47.
11. See Cornelius, 473 U.S. at 800 (discussing various standards).
12. Hague v. Committee for Indus. Org., 307 U.S. 496, 515 (1938) (striking down a
municipal ordinance forbidding the distribution of printed matter and public meetings in
streets and other public places); see also Young v. American Mini Theatres, Inc., 427 U.S.
50, 63 (1976) ("[T]he use of streets and parks for the free expression of views on national
affairs may not be conditioned upon the sovereign's agreement with what a speaker may
intend to say.").
13. See International Soc'y for Krishna Consciousness, Inc. v. Lee, 505 U.S. 672, 680
(1992) ("[T]he government does not create a [designated] public forum by inaction" or by
permitting limited discourse, but only "'by intentionally opening a nontraditional public
forum for public discourse'(quoting Cornelius, 473 U. S. at 802)).
14. Perry, 460 U.S. at 46 n.7. This type of forum, also known as a "footnote 7" forum,
allows access to a forum only for specific groups or purposes. See id. (citing Widmar v.
Vincent, 454 U.S. 263, 264-65 (1981) (access by student groups) and Madison Joint Sch.
Dist. v. Wisconsin Pub. Employment Relations Comm'n, 429 U.S. 167, 169 (1976) (use of
forum only for school board business)).
15. See Perry, 460 U.S. at 45.
Arkansas Educational Television Commission v. Forbes
exclude a speaker based on his or her views. 16
The Forbes Court stated that although most public television programs
do not require scrutiny under public forum precedents, the candidate de-
bate is an exception." The Court has recognized that broadcasters are
entitled to the "widest journalistic freedom" 18 and that Congress did not
intend for broadcasting companies to be required to open their facilities
to anyone desiring to use them. 9 The Federal Communications Commis-
sion however, monitors both private and public broadcasters and Con-
gress requires them to schedule programming that serves the public
interest.2
As the 1992 elections approached, the Arkansas Educational Televi-
sion Commission (AETC) decided to sponsor a series of debates, in-
cluding a debate for candidates vying for the seat in the Third Congres-
sional District." Ralph Forbes was a certified independent candidate
who had run unsuccessfully in 1990 for Lieutenant Governor on the Re-
publican ticket.22 Forbes was also known for his involvement in the white
supremacist movement and his management of fellow white supremacist
David Duke's 1988 presidential campaign. After his certification as a
candidate, Forbes contacted AETC to ask permission to participate in
the debate.24 AETC informed Forbes of its intention to include only the
two major party candidates in the debate because it did not consider him
16. See Cornelius, 473 U.S. at 800.
17. See Arkansas Educ. Television Comm'n v. Forbes, 523 U.S. 666, 675 (1998). Jus-
tice Kennedy, writing for the majority, noted both the significance of the debate in the
electoral context and the debate forum as a free flowing exchange between candidates as
reasons for applying forum doctrine to Forbes. See id.
18. See Columbia Broad. Sys., Inc. v. Democratic Nat'l Comm., 412 U.S. 94, 110, 132
(1973) (holding that a broadcaster who meets public obligations to provide fair coverage
of public issues does not have to accept editorial advertisements).
19. See id. at 105.
20. See 47 U.S.C. § 309(a) (1994) (stating that in granting broadcasting licenses, Fed-
eral Communications Commission (FCC) considerations include whether the public inter-
est, convenience, and necessity will be served by the acceptance of such application); see
also Red Lion Broad. Co., Inc. v. Federal Communications Comm'n, 395 U.S. 367, 400-01
(1969) (holding that due to the scarcity of frequencies, broadcasters must allow limited
access to their facilities to further the public interest in a range of viewpoints).
21. See Forbes, 523 U.S. at 670.
22. See id. at 670, 684-85. Although he was ultimately unsuccessful in his bid for
Lieutenant Governor, Ralph Forbes received 46% of the vote in a three-candidate race in
the Republican primary. See Respondent's Brief at 4, Arkansas Educ. Television Comm'n
v. Forbes, 523 U.S. 666 (1998) (No. 96-779). In addition, Forbes won a majority in 15 of
the 16 counties located in the Third Congressional District. See id.
23. See Robert Marquand, Which Candidates Get to Speak on TV?, CHRISTIAN SCI.
MONITOR, Oct. 9, 1997, at 1.
24. See Forbes, 523 U.S. at 670.
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a serious candidate or one popular enough to be included.2
Forbes filed suit in United States District Court for the Western Dis-
trict of Arkansas, seeking both to enjoin the debate from proceeding
without him and damages.26 Forbes claimed a right to limited equal ac-
cess to television coverage under both the Communications Act of 193427
and the First Amendment.8 The district court dismissed Forbes' com-
plaint for failure to state a claim.
Forbes appealed and the Eighth Circuit remanded the First Amend-
ment claim, whereupon the district court concluded as a matter of law
that the debate was a nonpublic forum. ° After the court determined that
it was a nonpublic forum, however, the jury found that Forbes' exclusion
was neither "the result of political pressure" nor based on opposition to
his political views; thus, the court entered judgment in favor of AETC.3"
Forbes again appealed the district court ruling to the Eighth Circuit for
25. See Forbes v. Arkansas Educ. Television Communication Network Found.,
22 F.3d 1423, 1426 (8th Cir. 1994). Forbes claimed that an AETC official told him that the
network would rather run "St. Elsewhere" than any debate that included Forbes. See id.
26. See Forbes, 523 U.S. at 671.
27. See Communications Act of 1934, 47 U.S.C. § 315(a) (1994) (as amended). The
Act states:
If any licensee shall permit any person who is a legally qualified candidate for
any public office to use a broadcasting station, he shall afford equal opportunities
to all other such candidates for that office in the use of such broadcasting station:
Provided, That such licensee shall have no power of censorship over the material
broadcast under the provisions of this section.
Id.
28. See Forbes, 523 U.S. at 671.
29. See Forbes, 22 F.3d at 1428. The district court relied on DeYoung v. Patten,
898 F.2d 628 (8th Cir. 1990), which held that a statutory claim should be brought before
the FCC prior to reaching a court, and that no First Amendment right to appear in tele-
vised debates exists beyond that granted by 47 U.S.C. § 315. See id. at 633-35. Forbes ap-
pealed the dismissal to the Eighth Circuit. See Forbes, 22 F.3d. at 1425. That court af-
firmed the dismissal of Forbes' statutory claims, but reversed the district court holding as
to Forbes' First Amendment claim. See id. at 1430. The Eighth Circuit thereby overruled
that portion of DeYoung that held that the First Amendment places no restraint on a state
agency to sponsor candidate debates and pick which candidates will be included. See id.
The court stated that regardless the type of forum, AETN would have to provide a view-
point-neutral reason to justify the exclusion of Forbes. See id. at 1429-30. Because AETN
had not filed an answer providing the reasons for the exclusion of Forbes, the Eighth Cir-
cuit remanded, stating that without a neutral reason for exclusion, Forbes had stated a
claim. See id. at 1430.
30. See Forbes v. Arkansas Educ. Television Comm'n, 93 F.3d 497, 499 (8th Cir.
1996). Once the court determined that the debate was a nonpublic forum, it decided that
as long as Forbes' exclusion was reasonable and viewpoint neutral, it was constitutional.
See Cornelius v. NAACP Legal Defense & Educ. Fund, Inc., 473 U.S. 788, 800 (1985) (dis-
cussing the standard for exclusion from a nonpublic forum).
31. See Forbes, 93 F.3d at 499.
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de novo review of the First Amendment forum issue. The circuit court
noted that in defining the parameters of the forum, the court should con-
sider the type of access sought by the speaker.32 The court determined
that Forbes was solely seeking access to the debate, not general access to
the station.3 Thus, the Eighth Circuit held that Forbes was seeking ac-
cess to a state-designated public forum.3 The court also declared Forbes
a member of the class of speakers for whom the state established the fo-
rum." Consequently, AETC could not exclude Forbes as a member of
that class without a narrowly tailored, compelling reason.36 The court
held that AETC's opinion on the viability of Forbes' candidacy was in-
sufficient justification for his exclusion from the debate.37 As a result,
AETC appealed, and the Supreme Court granted certiorari to resolve a
split between the Eighth and Eleventh Circuits regarding the forum
status of a public television debate."
In a six-three decision delivered by Justice Kennedy, the Court re-
versed the Eighth Circuit, holding that the Arkansas debate was a non-
public forum and that Forbes' exclusion "was a reasonable, viewpoint
neutral exercise of journalistic discretion consistent with the First
32. See id. at 503 (citing Cornelius v. NAACP Legal Defense & Educ. Fund, Inc.,
473 U.S. 788, 801 (1985)). The circuit court noted that "if the speaker seeks general access
to public property, the forum encompasses that property." Id. at 503. If a speaker, how-
ever, is only seeking limited access, the court must take "'a more tailored approach"' to
determine the perimeters of the forum. See id.
33. See id.
34. See id. at 504 ("There is no bright line or objective test for determining the char-
acter of the forum. We can say without reservation, however, that the forum in this case,
the debate, is a limited public forum.").
35. See id. The Eight Circuit stated that AETC could not "ipse dixit, define a class of
speakers so as to exclude a person who would naturally be expected to be a member of the
class on no basis other than party affiliation." Id.
36. See id. at 505.
37. See id. at 504-05. The court stated that questions of viability should be left to the
voters. See id.
38. See Arkansas Educ. Television Comm'n v. Forbes, 523 U.S. 666, 672 (1998). In
Chandler v. Georgia Public Telecommunications Commission, 917 F.2d 486 (11th Cir.
1990), the United States District Court for the Northern District of Georgia issued an in-
junction to stop a debate that excluded Libertarian candidates. See id. at 488. The Geor-
gia Public Telecommunications Commission (GPTC) appealed the injunction to the Elev-
enth Circuit Court of Appeals. See id. Unlike the Eighth Circuit in Forbes, the Eleventh
Circuit did not make a distinction between type of access sought by the candidate-access
to the network or access to the debate alone. See id. Holding that the debate was a non-
public forum, the court reasoned that GPTC's decision to exclude the candidates was not
viewpoint restrictive and was based on journalistic discretion in an effort to allow the de-
bate to function more effectively. See id. at 488-89. The Eleventh Circuit held therefore,
that the exclusion of the Libertarians was constitutional and the court vacated the injunc-
tion and remanded with instructions to dismiss the complaint. See id. at 490.
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Amendment. 39 In coming to this conclusion, the Court followed the
precedent established in Perry Education Ass'n v. Perry Local Educators'
Ass'n4° that permits exclusion from the nonpublic forum based on status
rather than the views of the speaker. 1 In his dissent, Justice Stevens,
joined by Justices Ginsburg and Souter, did not challenge the finding that
public television stations do not have to allow access to every candidate.42
Rather, he challenged the ad hoc decision of AETC to exclude Forbes
from the debate as subjective and arbitrary. 4 Justice Stevens advocated
for the establishment of an objective set of criteria to eliminate the risks
inherent in allowing state owned networks to stage political debates. 44
This Note first discusses the variety of contexts in which the Supreme
Court has examined the public forum debate in the broadcasting context.
Next, this Note analyzes the majority and dissenting opinions in Forbes
and concludes that the Court mislabeled the debate a nonpublic forum.
This Note agrees with the dissent that the subjective, standardless char-
acter of AETC's exclusion of Forbes from the nonpublic forum creates
the impression that the exclusion was viewpoint-based in violation of the
First Amendment. Accordingly, the Court should have required state
owned broadcasters to use pre-established objective guidelines in future
decisions regarding access to the forum.
I. DEFERENCE TO JOURNALISTIC DISCRETION: THE PUBLIC FORUM
ANALYSIS AND THE COURT'S ROLE IN SCRUTINIZING THE DECISIONS
OF BROADCASTERS
The doctrinal framework of the Supreme Court's public forum analysis
has been developed and applied in a variety of contexts.45 Each time,
39. Forbes, 523 U.S. at 683.
40. 460 U.S. 37 (1983).
41. See id. at 49 (noting that the right to restrict access to the nonpublic forum based
on subject matter or speaker identity is necessary to insure that the property is used for its
intended purposes).
42. See Forbes, 523 U.S. at 683 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
43. See id. at 684 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
44. See id. at 693-95 (Stevens, J., dissenting). Justice Stevens stated that the majority
underestimated the importance of the difference between private and public broadcasters.
See id. at 684-87. Stevens argued that the risk of governmental censorship through the
making of arbitrary decisions based on the views of the speaker necessitates the estab-
lishment of objective standards for use by public broadcasters. See id. at 688, 695.
45. See International Soc'y for Krishna Consciousness, Inc. v. Lee, 505 U.S. 672, 682
(1992) (holding that state controlled airport terminals are nonpublic forums and therefore,
that states may lawfully regulate solicitation within terminals); see also Police Dep't of
Chicago v. Mosley, 408 U.S. 92, 101-02 (1972) (invalidating a selective prohibition of pick-
eting on a sidewalk in front of a school, and stating that the government cannot choose
[Vol. 49:613
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however, the Court balances the individual's First Amendment right to
free speech against the practical concerns of governmental functions.4
In the context of both public and private broadcasting, the Court has
determined that as a general rule, broadcasting "does not lend itself to
scrutiny under the forum doctrine."47 Broadcasters traditionally have
had almost absolute journalistic discretion in their programming
choices.4 The candidate debate, though, is a narrow exception to this
rule.49 In determining debate access, the Court assesses the importance
of such debates and attempts to comport its analysis into its public forum
framework."°
A. The Court's Public Forum Analysis
1. The Traditional Public Forum
Of the three types of fora, the traditional public forum provides a
speaker with the greatest constitutional protection. The Court has long
which ideas are subject to suppression); Schneider v. State, 308 U.S. 147, 165 (1939)
(holding that a state may not prohibit the distribution of literature in streets and parks that
are traditional public forums, as long as such activity does not interfere with others using
the forum).
46. See, e.g., Mosley, 408 U.S. at 98. Mosley was protesting discrimination against
blacks by picketing in front of a public school. See id. at 93. The Court recognized that
Mosley's action was expressive and entitled to the protection provided by the First
Amendment. See id. at 95. The Court noted, however, that not "all picketing must always
be allowed." Id. at 98. "We have continually recognized that reasonable 'time place and
manner' regulations of picketing may be necessary to further significant governmental in-
terests." Id. The Court struck down the challenged ordinance, holding that it was not a
regulation of the time, place, or manner of speech, but an impermissible regulation of the
subject matter of the speech. See id. at 99.
47. Forbes, 523 U.S. at 675. The Court has allowed both Congress and the FCC to
determine and regulate the appropriate requirements for public access to the airwaves.
See 47 U.S.C. § 309(a) (1994). The Court has expressed concern that the application of
forum analysis in the broadcasting context would require courts to participate in the edito-
rial decisions of broadcasters. See Forbes, 523 U.S. at 673-74.
48. See Columbia Broad. Sys., Inc. v. Democratic Nat'l Comm., 412 U.S. 94, 110
(1973) (noting that the wide journalistic freedom of broadcasters may only be impinged
when the public interest outweighs the private journalistic interests of the broadcasters);
see also Federal Communications Comm'n v. League of Women Voters, 468 U.S. 364, 402
(1984) (invalidating a statutory ban on editorializing by federally funded television sta-
tions).
49. See Forbes, 523 U.S. at 675 (1998) ("For two reasons, a candidate debate like the
one at issue here is different from other programming. First, unlike AETC's other broad-
casts, the debate was by design a forum for political speech by the candidates .... Second,
in our tradition, candidate debates are of exceptional significance in the electoral proc-
ess."). See also infra Part II.A.1 (discussing the candidate debate exception enunciated by
the Court in Forbes).
50. See Forbes, 523 U.S. at 675-76.
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held that citizens should enjoy the privilege and right to use the tradi-
tional public forum, such as a town square or park.51
In Schneider v. State,52 the Court first defined the limits of state regula-
tion of speech in the traditional public forum by holding invalid munici-
pal ordinances against leafleting on streets or other public places.53 The
Schneider Court held that the prevention of litter in streets was insuffi-
cient as a state interest to justify an absolute ban on leafleting.54 The
Court stated that as long as those people distributing information were
not impeding the flow of traffic or other citizens attempting to use the
street, their actions were protected because streets are the natural place
for dissemination of information and exchange of opinion.55
The Court further clarified the definition and rule for state restriction
on access in Perry Education Ass'n v. Perry Local Educators' Ass'n.56
The Perry Court stated that objective characteristics define the tradi-
tional public forum, such as whether "by long tradition or by government
fiat," the forum has been "devoted to assembly and debate."57 In a tradi-
tional public forum, the state can exclude a speaker only if exclusion
serves a compelling state interest and is narrowly drawn to serve that in-
51. See Hague v. Committee for Indus. Org., 307 U.S. 496, 515 (1939) ("Wherever the
title of streets and parks may rest, they have immemorially been held in trust for the use of
the public and, time out of mind, have been used for purposes of assembly, communicating
thoughts between citizens, and discussing public questions.").
52. 308 U.S. 147 (1939).
53. See id. at 160. This decision consolidated four cases from different states, each
challenging a municipal ordinance that made it illegal to use streets and parks for leaflet-
ting, regardless of subject matter. See id. at 153-54. Each municipality claimed a right to
prevent litter as the reason for enacting such a statute. See id. at 154-57. Of those charged
with violating the ordinance, three were passing out information while on the sidewalk,
concerning a labor dispute, a discussion of the war with Spain, and a protest in connection
with the administration of unemployment insurance, respectively. See id. The other was
cited for distributing literature about the Jehovah's Witnesses from door to door. See id.
at 158.
54. See id. at 162. The majority noted, "Any burden imposed upon the city authori-
ties in cleaning and caring for the streets as an indirect consequence of such distribution
results from the constitutional protection of the freedom of speech and press." I.
55. See id. at 160. Likewise, the Court has ruled that government may not restrict the
subject matter of those picketing on the public sidewalk. See Police Dep't of Chicago v.
Mosley, 408 U.S. 92, 93-94 (1972). In Mosley, the Court struck down an ordinance ban-
ning all picketing in front of a school except picketing involving a labor dispute. See id. at
94. Mosley had been protesting in front of Jones High School against its alleged racist
practices; Justice Marshall wrote, "government may not grant the use of a forum to people
whose views it finds acceptable, but deny use to those wishing to express less favored or
more controversial views." Id. at 93, 96.
56. 460 U.S. 37 (1983).
57. See id. at 45.
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terest." Although the state can enforce reasonable time, place, and
manner regulations on the use of the traditional public forum, the Court
requires that regulations be narrowly tailored to advance significant gov-
ernmental interests.59
2. The Designated Public Forum
The second forum category is the designated public forum.6' Here, the
state has acted affirmatively to create a public forum where none tradi-
tionally existed.6 A court will examine the actions of the state in deter-
mining whether the state intended to designate an area as a public fo-
rum.62 Courts will also examine the characteristics of the forum to
determine if the property is one where speech activity is likely to occur."
If the Court determines that the state created a designated public forum,
the Court applies the same level of judicial scrutiny as the traditional
public forum."
In Widmar v. Vincent,6' a university made its facilities generally avail-
able for the use of registered student groups.6 The Supreme Court ruled
that by creating a forum generally available to student groups, the uni-
58. See id.
59. See id.; see also Heffron v. International Soc'y for Krishna Consciousness, Inc.,
452 U.S. 640 (1981). In Heffron, the Court upheld a regulation of solicitation on state fair-
ground property that limited solicitation to a licensed booth. See id. at 648-49. The Court
stated that the test of reasonableness required that the regulations "'are justified without
reference to the content of the regulated speech, that they serve a significant governmen-
tal interest, and that in doing so they leave open ample alternative channels for communi-
cation of the information."' Id. at 648 (quoting Virginia Pharmacy Bd. v. Virginia Citizens
Consumer Council, 425 U.S. 748, 771 (1976)). As Heffron illustrates, the state may place
reasonable time, place, and manner restrictions on access to the public forum and still
withstand constitutional scrutiny. See id. at 655.
60. See Perry, 460 U.S. at 45-46 (describing the designated public forum and its stan-
dards for exclusion).
61. See International Soc'y for Krishna Consciousness, Inc. v. Lee, 505 U.S. 672, 680
(1992) (concluding that state-owned airport terminals are not public fora).
62. See Cornelius v. NAACP Legal Defense & Educ. Fund, Inc., 473 U.S. 788, 800
(1985) (noting that in a forum analysis, the Court must weigh the government's interest in
limiting use of the property for its intended purpose against rights of access to the prop-
erty).
63. See Widmar v. Vincent, 454 U.S. 263, 267 n.5 (1981) (holding that the university
setting provides many opportunities for debate for its students and has many characteris-
tics of the public forum).
64. See Cornelius, 473 U.S. at 800; see also Police Dep't of Chicago v. Mosley, 408
U.S. 92, 96 (1972) ("Once a forum is opened up to assembly or speaking by some groups,
government may not prohibit others from assembling or speaking on the basis of what
they intend to say.").
65. 454 U.S. 263 (1981).
66. See id. at 267.
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versity intended to open the facility for expressive purposes and there-
fore could not close those facilities to an on-campus religious group that
sought access to the area for meetings.67 In holding that First Amend-
ment rights of speech extend to the campuses of state universities, the
Court noted that the characteristics of the university setting represent a
pure "'marketplace of ideas."' ' The Court held that the content-based
exclusion of the religious student group violated the fundamental princi-
ple that state regulation of speech in a designated public forum must be
content neutral and narrowly tailored to serve a compelling state inter-
est.69 As later cases would define, the state must make a forum generally
available, as in Widmar, for the court to consider it a designated public
forum. Otherwise, courts deem the forum nonpublic.0
3. The Nonpublic Forum
When the state has limited access to a particular forum by denying
general access, or if the forum property lacks the characteristics of a fo-
rum for expressive activity, then it falls into the third category of the
nonpublic forum. The Court in Cornelius v. NAACP71 noted that the
government's policy of limiting participation in a federal charity cam-
paign to certain organizations revealed its intention not to create a forum
generally open to organizations.72
In Cornelius, various groups, including the NAACP, argued that exclu-
sion of some groups from participation in the federally sponsored charity
campaign violated those groups' First Amendment rights to solicit chari-
table donations.73 The Court held that the charity campaign was a non-
public forum rather than a designated public forum because the charac-
teristics of the property used for the campaign were not consistent with
expressive activity. 74 The Court also noted that organizations seeking to
67. See id. at 277.
68. See id. at 267 n.5 (quoting Healy v. James, 408 U.S. 169, 180 (1972)).
69. See id. at 270, 277.
70. See Perry Educ. Ass'n v. Perry Local Educators' Ass'n, 460 U.S. 37, 47 (1983)
(stating that where the state has established a forum and then limited access to that forum,
it did not create a designated public forum). The Court noted that because the public
school reserved access to the teacher's mailboxes, the exclusion of a teachers union from
access was constitutional. See id. at 47-48.
71. 473 U.S. 788 (1985).
72. See id. at 804.
73. See id. at 795-96. Solicitation of funds by charitable organizations is recognized as
a protected interest by the First Amendment's guarantee of freedom of speech. See Vil-
lage of Schaumburg v. Citizens for a Better Env't, 444 U.S. 620, 639 (1980) (striking down
an ordinance prohibiting solicitation in the public forum).
74. See Cornelius, 473 U.S. at 805-06. "We will not find that a public forum has been
[Vol. 49:613
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join the campaign were required to get permission-clear evidence that
the government did not intend to make the campaign "generally avail-
able. , 5 The Cornelius Court stated that regulation of access to the non-
public forum must be reasonable and not an attempt to suppress a
76speaker's view because public officials oppose that view.
Prior to Cornelius, the Court in Perry had noted that "the 'First
Amendment does not guarantee access to property simply because it is
owned or controlled by the government.' 77 Perry involved a teachers'
union in competition with a public school teachers' existing union that
was denied access to an inter-school mailbox system for teachers, while
the union currently representing the teachers was granted access.7 ' The
Court held that the mailbox system was a nonpublic forum because the
school traditionally had limited outside access to the boxes.79 This fact
demonstrated that, unlike the government in Widmar, the school did not
intend to make access generally available. 80 The Court noted further that
the characteristics of the forum property did not suggest that it was a
place for free expressive activity."' Finally, the Court found that the
school based its policy on the rival union's outsider status rather than on
its views."
In both Perry and Cornelius, the Court relied on the intentions of the
state in opening the forum, the characteristics of the property, and the
relative status of the speaker in deciding that the exclusion of the union
was constitutional.82 The nonpublic forum designation, however, does
not permit the government to exclude speakers with impunity.84 Al-
created in the face of clear evidence of a contrary intent, nor will we infer that the gov-
ernment intended to create a public forum when the nature of the property is inconsistent
with expressive activity." Id. at 803 (citation omitted).
75. See id. at 804-05.
76. See id. at 800 (quoting Perry Educ. Ass'n v. Perry Local Educators' Ass'n, 460
U.S. 37, 46 (1983)).
77. Perry, 460 U.S. at 46 (quoting United States Postal Serv. v. Council of Green-
burgh Civic Ass'ns, 453 U.S. 114, 129 (1981)).
78. See id. at 39-40.
79. See id. at 47.
80. See id. at 48. "Implicit in the concept of the nonpublic forum is the right to make
distinctions in access on the basis of subject matter and speaker identity." Id. at 49.
81. See id. at 46-47. The Court noted that the school district had a legitimate interest
in preserving the mailboxes for their intended use as an internal means of communication.
See id. at 50-51.
82. See id. at 49. The Court held that distinctions that are unconstitutional in the
public forum may be permissible in the nonpublic forum in order to preserve the property
for its intended purpose. See id.
83. See Cornelius v. NAACP, 473 U.S. 788, 803-04 (1985); Perry, 460 U.S. at 46-47,
49.
84. See International Soc'y for Krishna Consciousness, Inc. v. Lee, 505 U.S. 672, 687
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though it is easier for a state to exclude a speaker in the nonpublic fo-
rum, exclusion cannot be based on the speaker's viewpoint and must be
reasonable in light of the purpose of the property.
8
B. Traditional Deference To Congress, the FCC, and the Editorial
Discretion of Broadcasters in Determinations on Access to the Airwaves
Prior to Arkansas Educational Television Commission v. Forbes, the
Supreme Court had not applied public forum doctrine to private or pub-
lic broadcasting for fear that it would open the floodgates for third par-
ties claiming rights of access.8 Further, the Court noted that broad rights
of access would be antithetical to the journalistic purpose and statutory
obligations of broadcasters.87 Therefore, the Court allowed broadcasters
great latitude in the area of editorial discretion and relied on Congress to
protect the public's interest in the fair and accurate representation of op-
posing views." Broadcasting licenses are scarce resources, however, and
the Court stated that the First Amendment must define the boundaries
of congressional regulatory power in the broadcasting arena.89
Despite the Court's inclination against intrusion into the journalistic
discretion of public broadcasters, the dissemination of information re-
garding public affairs has proved to be an exception.9° In CBS, Inc. v.
(1992) (O'Connor, J., concurring) (concluding that although airport terminals are non-
public fora, the government cannot prohibit all First Amendment activities).
85. See Cornelius, 473 U.S. at 800.
86. See Columbia Broad. Sys., Inc. v. Democratic Nat'l Comm., 412 U.S. 94, 126-27,
132 (1973) (relying on FCC regulation rather than First Amendment forum doctrine to
govern right of access).
87. See Arkansas Educ. Television Comm'n v. Forbes, 523 U.S. 666, 673 (1998).
88. See CBS, Inc. v. Federal Communications Comm'n, 453 U.S. 367, 396-97 (1981)
(upholding a statutory right to limited television access for federal candidates); see also
Federal Communications Comm'n v. League of Women Voters, 468 U.S. 364, 402 (1984)
(invalidating a section of the public broadcasting act that prevented federally funded
broadcasters from editorializing). The Court in League of Women Voters stated that "if
the public's interest in receiving a balanced presentation of views is to be fully served, we
must necessarily rely in large part upon the editorial initiative and judgment of broadcast-
ers who bear the public trust." Id. at 378 (citation omitted).
89. See League of Women Voters, 468 U.S. at 377-78; see also Red Lion Broad. Co.,
Inc. v. Federal Communications Comm'n, 395 U.S. 367, 375 (1969) (upholding access
regulations under the FCC's "fairness doctrine"). In Red Lion, the Court stated that "as
far as the First Amendment is concerned those who are licensed stand no better than
those to whom licenses are refused." Id. at 389. "[T]he licensee has no constitutional right
to... monopolize a radio frequency to the exclusion of his fellow citizens." Id. at 389.
90. See Red Lion, 395 U.S. at 390. "It is the right of the viewers and listeners, not the
right of the broadcasters, which is paramount." Id. "It is the purpose of the First
Amendment to preserve an uninhibited marketplace of ideas in which truth will ultimately
prevail...." Id.
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Federal Communications Commission," the Court recognized the impor-
tance of public exposure to candidates that enables "'the electorate [to]
intelligently evaluate the candidates' personal qualities and their posi-
tions on vital public issues before choosing among them on election
day." '92 The Court in CBS upheld the FCC's application of 47 U.S.C.
§ 312(a)(7) 9' to federal election television access.94 The Court stated that
the regulation was a congressional effort to assure that a scarce resource,
the broadcasting airwaves, was used in the public interest.95 The Court
held that the right to airtime provided by § 312(a)(7) best reconciled the
First Amendment with the rights of broadcasters and the public."
In contrast, the Court in Columbia Broadcasting System, Inc. v. Demo-
cratic National Committee7 held that the FCC's refusal to require broad-
cast licensees to accept all paid political advertisements was consistent
with the First Amendment." The Court expressed concerns that such an
imposition would intrude into the editorial discretion of broadcasters."
The Court stated further that the First Amendment allows broadcasters
the widest journalistic freedom consistent with their public duties. °
In Federal Communications Commission v. League of Women Voters, 1
operators of noncommercial, educational broadcasting stations filed suit
to challenge section 399 of the Public Broadcasting Act of 1967,'02 which
91. 453 U.S. 367 (1981).
92. Id. at 396 (quoting Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 52-53 (1976)).
93. See 47 U.S.C. § 312(a)(7) (1994):
The Commission may revoke any station license or construction permit ... for
willful or repeated failure to allow reasonable access to or to permit purchase of
reasonable amounts of time for the use of a broadcasting station by a legally
qualified candidate for Federal elective office on behalf of his candidacy.
Id.
94. See CBS, 453 U.S. at 397. The 1980 Carter-Mondale ticket had approached the
three major networks requesting that they air a thirty minute program about the Carter
administration and candidacy during prime time. See id. at 371. When each network ef-
fectively declined, the Carter-Mondale Presidential Committee filed a complaint with the
Federal Communications Commission charging that the networks had violated the "rea-
sonable access" provisions of the Communications Act of 1934. See id. at 372-74.
95. See id. at 397.
96. See id. The Court held that by denying access to the Carter campaign during an
election cycle, the networks had violated the "reasonable access" provisions. See id.
97. 412 U.S. 94 (1973).
98. See id. at 121.
99. See id. at 123-25.
100. See id. at 110.
101. 468 U.S. 364 (1984).
102. 47 U.S.C. §§ 390, 399 (1994).
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prohibited those stations receiving federal funding from editorializing.'03
The Court noted that because broadcast frequencies are a scarce re-
source, licensees act as fiduciaries, assuring that the public is exposed to
differing views. Whereas the opportunity to advocate one's own posi-
tions without airing those of an opponent may be acceptable for newspa-
per publishers, broadcasters do not enjoy the same opportunity.'0 ' Al-
though the Court noted the special considerations of broadcasters, it held
that section 399 violated the First Amendment, affirming the precedents
that demonstrated considerable faith in the editorial discretion of broad-
casters.'0
Although the Supreme Court has been reluctant to apply forum analy-
sis in the broadcasting context, the Court decided to apply this frame-
work to the decision made by AETC'O° in Arkansas Educational Televi-
sion Commission v. Forbes,'08 noting the importance of the candidate
debate. In Forbes, the Court balanced forum precedent against the
rights of broadcasters to use editorial discretion."°9 The Court's decisions
in the broadcasting context allow broadcasters, both public and private,
wide journalistic discretion to determine what their networks air.1 The
Court, however, has noted that because broadcasting licenses are a
scarce commodity, broadcasters have public interest responsibilities not
imposed on non-broadcast journalists."' In the context of electoral de-
bates, the Court has attempted to balance its deference to editorial dis-
cretion against the importance of media access for candidates seeking
elective office.
103. See League of Women Voters, 468 U.S. at 370 n.7.
104. See id. at 377.
105. See id. at 376-77. In League of Women Voters, the Court noted that First
Amendment claims of access against broadcasters require different treatment than similar
claims of access to other media due to the scarcity of broadcast frequencies and the regula-
tion of broadcasters by the government. See id.
106. See id. at 402.
107. See id. at 675.
108. 523 U.S. 666 (1998).
109. See id. at 676-82.
110. See League of Women Voters, 468 U.S. at 379; see also Columbia Broad. Sys., Inc.
v. Democratic Nat'l Comm., 412 U.S. 94, 111 (1973).
111. See League of Women Voters, 468 U.S. at 376. The Court stated that those ob-
taining licenses have a duty to present "'those views and voices which are representative of
[their] community and which would otherwise, by necessity, be barred from the air-
waves."' See id. at 377 (quoting Red Lion Broad. Co., Inc. v. Federal Communications
Comm'n, 395 U.S. 367, 389 (1969)).
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II. AETC v. FORBES: APPLYING FORUM ANALYSIS TO THE PUBLIC
BROADCASTING DEBATE
The Supreme Court granted certiorari to Arkansas Educational Televi-
sion Commission v. Forbes12 to resolve a split between the Eighth and
Eleventh Circuits. ' The Eleventh Circuit held that the candidate debate
was not a public forum,'1 4 but the Eighth Circuit held that the AETC de-
bate was a designated public forum, established for a class of speakers-
candidates for the Third Congressional District.'15 The Eighth Circuit
stated further that Forbes was a member of that class and that any exclu-
sion of Forbes must be narrowly tailored to serve a compelling state in-
terest.16 The Eighth Circuit held that exclusion of Forbes based on staff
112. 523 U.S. 666 (1998).
113. See id. at 672.
114. See Chandler v. Georgia Pub. Telecomms. Comm'n, 917 F.2d 486, 488-89 (11th
Cir. 1990); see also supra note 38 (discussing Chandler's procedural history).
115. See Forbes v. Arkansas Educ. Television Comm'n, 93 F.3d 497, 503 (8th Cir.
1996) (determining de novo the type of forum to which Forbes sought access). The Forbes
court relied on Cornelius v. NAACP Legal Defense & Education Fund, Inc., 473 U.S. 788
(1985), for help in determining the forum classification. See Forbes, 93 F.3d at 503. "'In
defining the forum we [I focus [] on the access sought by the speaker."' Id. (quoting Cor-
nelius, 473 U.S. at 801). The court stated that if only limited access is sought, the court
should use a "'more tailored approach to ascertain [] the perimeters of a forum....' See
id. (quoting Cornelius, 473 U.S. at 801). Forbes sought access to the debate, not access to
the network as a whole, enabling the court to focus its evaluation on the debate as the
relevant forum. See id.
In its analysis, the Eighth Circuit found the debate forum most similar to the forum cre-
ated in Widmar v. Vincent, 454 U.S. 263 (1981), where a state university created a desig-
nated public forum by opening its facilities to student groups. See Forbes 93 F.3d at 504.
In Widmar, the Supreme Court held that the university could not open a forum for expres-
sive activity and then exclude certain student groups. See Widmar, 454 U.S. at 277. The
Eighth Circuit, relying on Widmar, found that the debate was a designated public forum.
See Forbes, 93 F.3d at 504.
The circuit court then distinguished Cornelius, stating that the charity campaign in-
volved was not clearly established as a forum for expressive activity, in contrast to the
candidate debate. See id. at 504. The Eighth Circuit stated that the debate was a place
opened by the state for a limited class of speakers, candidates for the Third Congressional
District seat, a class of which Forbes was a member. See id. The exclusion of Forbes was a
prior restraint because the state cannot "define a class of speakers so as to exclude a per-
son who would naturally be expected to be a member of the class." See id.
The Eighth Circuit stated further that the decision of AETC to exclude Forbes based on
the subjective opinions of governmental employees rendered the decision suspect. See id.
Any decision based on political viability would be "so arguable, so susceptible of variation
in individual opinion, as to provide no secure basis for the exercise of governmental power
consistent with the First Amendment." Id. at 505. The court also recognized that such a
determination was especially suspect when Forbes had already satisfied Arkansas' own
test of viability by his certification as a candidate. See id. at 504.
116. See Forbes, 93 F.3d at 505.
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members' opinions was not narrowly tailored and that the reasons given
for Forbes' exclusion did not serve a compelling state interest.'17
The Supreme Court reversed the Eighth Circuit."' It determined that
the candidate debate constituted a narrow exception to the rule that
public forum doctrine should not be applied in the broadcasting con-
text. ' The Court applied its public forum framework analysis and de-
termined that the debate was a nonpublic forum, concluding that the ex-
clusion of Forbes from the debate was constitutional.20
A. The Majority Opinion: Overturning the Eighth Circuit and Holding
that the Exclusion of Forbes from a Nonpublic Forum was a
Viewpoint-Neutral Exercise of Editorial Discretion
In overturning the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals, the Court placed
public and private broadcasters on comparable footing when applying
journalistic discretion in the coordination of candidate debates.'2' After
determining that the debate was a nonpublic forum, the majority relied
on the assertions of AETC directors to conclude that Forbes' exclusion
was viewpoint neutral, not a result of political pressure, and therefore
constitutional. 122
1. Noting that the Candidate Debate is an Exception to the Rule that
Forum Doctrine Should Not be Applied in the Broadcasting Context
The Forbes Court sought to determine whether the application of the
public forum doctrine was appropriate in the context of public broad-
casting. 3 Justice Kennedy, speaking for the majority, noted that the
Court traditionally had avoided the examination of editorial decisions
made by television producers.'24 The majority feared that intrusions into
the realm of broadcasters would likely entangle the judicial branch in the
daily editorial decisions of producers and could lead to endless litigation
117. See id. The Eighth Circuit declared that the exclusion of Forbes based on subjec-
tive notions of viability was not legally sufficient under the First Amendment. See id.
118. See Arkansas Educ. Television Comm'n v. Forbes, 523 U.S. 666,683 (1998).
119. See id. at 675.
120. See id. at 676-80, 682-83.
121. See id. at 683. The Court ruled that as long as the public broadcaster's decision to
exclude a candidate is reasonable and viewpoint neutral, it is not a violation of the First
Amendment. See id.
122. See id. at 682.
123. See id. at 672.
124. See id. at 672-73. Justice Kennedy stated that, "[a]s a general rule, the nature of
editorial discretion counsels against subjecting broadcasters to claims of viewpoint dis-
crimination." Id. at 673.
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by people claiming that their exclusion was unconstitutional. 1
Although the majority noted that public broadcasting did not lend it-
self to scrutiny under the public forum doctrine, the candidate debate
was an exception to the general rule for two reasons. 26 First, the candi-
date debate was different because it was designed as a political forum for
candidates to air their views without intrusion by the broadcaster. Sec-
ond, the "exceptional significance" of the candidate debate in the elec-
toral process justified unique treatment.2 Thus, the majority found that
"[t]he special characteristics of candidate debates support the conclusion
that the AETC debate was a forum of some type.",
129
2. Rejecting the Eighth Circuit and Defining the Debate as a Nonpublic
Forum
After defining the three types of fora, the majority applied its forum
analysis to the AETC debate. Citing International Society for Krishna
Consciousness, Inc. v. Lee,"3 the Court noted that the government cre-
ates a designated public forum only when it acts affirmatively to open a
nontraditional public forum for expressive activity.' To ascertain the
type of forum, a court first examines the policy and practice of the state
to determine its intentions.32 The majority distinguished Widmar, where
the state university opened its facilities to all student groups, from Cor-
nelius and Perry, where the government allowed only selective access to
a forum, thereby creating a nonpublic forum.'33 In Widmar, the majority
noted, access to the university's facilities was made "generally open" for
use by student groups, thereby creating a designated public forum."34 In
contrast, the nonpublic forums of both Cornelius and Perry did not allow
either general access to a fundraising campaign (Cornelius)".. or teachers'
mailboxes (Perry);3 6 instead, each required permission from the state be-
fore access would be granted.'37
125. See id. at 674.
126. See id. at 675.
127. See id.
128. See id. at 675-76.
129. Id. at 676.
130. 505 U.S. 672 (1992).
131. See Forbes, 523 U.S. at 677 (1998).
132. See id.
133. See id. at 678-80.
134. See Widmar v. Vincent, 454 U.S. 263, 267-68 (1981).
135. Cornelius v. NAACP Legal Defense & Educ. Fund, Inc., 473 U.S. 788,804-05 (1985).
136. Perry Educ. Ass'n v. Perry Local Educator's Ass'n, 460 U.S. 37, 46-47 (1983).
137. See Cornelius, 473 U.S. at 804; Perry, 460 U.S. at 47.
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The Forbes Court stated that the AETC debate was similar to both
Cornelius and Perry in that AETC did not make the debate generally
available to candidates, but rather reserved eligibility for certain Third
Congressional District candidates."' The majority noted that a state does
not create a designated public forum when it allows selective access for a
class of speakers. 39 The Court stated further that when a state designates
a forum for selective access without evidence that it intended it for public
use, such a forum is nonpublic in character.'4 The Court held that by
opening the debate to a class of Third District candidates, but then re-
serving eligibility for certain candidates, AETC had created a nonpublic
forum.
141
3. The Nonpublic Forum Determination Allows AETC to Exclude
Forbes as a Reasonable, Viewpoint-Neutral Exercise of Journalistic
Discretion
Once the Court established that the debate was a nonpublic forum, it
considered whether the exclusion of Forbes from the debate was view-
point neutral and reasonable in relation to the nature of the property.
142
The Court examined the reasons given by the Executive Director of
AETC, Susan Howarth, for excluding Forbes from the debate.' 43 She
reasoned that Forbes should be excluded because neither the voters of
Arkansas nor news organizations considered Forbes a "serious" candi-
date, so he lacked both the financial support and a campaign base from
which to mount a strong campaign. 44
The Court relied on Howarth's testimony to determine that the exclu-
sion of Forbes was not based on his viewpoint but because Forbes "had
generated no appreciable public interest.' 45 The Court also cited Perry,
138. See Arkansas Educ. Television Comm'n v. Forbes, 523 U.S. 666, 680 (1998).
139. See id.
140. See id. (citing Cornelius, 473 U.S. at 805).
141. See id.
142. See id. at 682.
143. See id.
144. See id. In her testimony, Howarth identified factors that contributed to her deci-
sion to exclude Forbes. See Joint Appendix of the Supreme Court Record at 118-19,
Forbes v. Arkansas Educ. Television Comm'n, 523 U.S. 666 (1998) (No. 96-779). First,
Forbes "didn't have a serious chance to win the election." Id at 119. Second, journalists
"did not think he had a chance to win the election." Id. at 118. Third, the news media
"weren't even planning to report his name on election night in the results." Id. Fourth,
Forbes "raised very few dollars and hadn't filed any paperwork with the Federal Election
Commission." Id. Fifth, "Forbes didn't really have any kind of formal campaign head-
quarters except for his house." Id.
145. See Forbes, 523 U.S. at 682.
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indicating that "exclusion from [the] nonpublic forum 'based on []status'
rather than the views of the speaker is permissible."' ' The majority con-
cluded that AETC had acted in good faith in excluding Forbes based
upon a reasonable, viewpoint neutral editorial decision, consistent with
First Amendment speech protections. 47
B. The Dissent: Taking Note of the Facts and Calling for Objective
Standards
Justice Stevens, along with Justices Ginsberg and Souter, dissented on
the grounds that the decision to exclude Forbes lacked sufficient ration-
ality and objectivity to withstand First Amendment scrutiny. The dis-
sent framed the issue as whether AETC had "defined the contours of the
debate forum with sufficient specificity to justify the exclusion of a ballot-
qualified candidate."' 49 The dissent argued that the ad hoc nature of the
AETC decision to exclude Forbes was similar to cases concerning prior
restraint where the Court invalidated municipal licensing processes be-
cause they lacked "narrow, objective, and definite standards to guide the
licensing authority."'5
The dissent then cited various facts from the record"' showing that
Forbes had previously been a viable candidate in the Third District.
5 2
The dissent also noted the subjective nature of AETC's decision.5 3 Jus-
146. Id. at 683 (quoting Perry Educ. Ass'n v. Perry Local Educators' Ass'n, 460 U.S.
37, 49 (1983)).
147. See id. at 683.
148. See id. at 683-84 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
149. Id. at 690.
150. Id. at 684. The dissent cited Shuttlesworth v. Birmingham, 394 U.S. 147, 150-51
(1969), where an ordinance requiring a license before using a public forum was found un-
constitutional because of the lack of objective, narrowly tailored standards. See Forbes,
523 U.S. at 684. In Shuttlesworth, the Court held that decisions regarding prior restraint,
without definite standards to guide the licensing authority are unconstitutional when First
Amendment freedoms are involved. See Shuttlesworth, 394 U.S. 147,150-51.
151. See Forbes, 523 U. S. at 684. The dissent noted that Forbes had run for lieutenant
governor in 1986 and again in 1990. See id. In a three-way race conducted for the Repub-
lican primary in 1990, Forbes received 46.88% of the statewide vote and he carried 15 of
the 16 counties in the Third Congressional District by absolute majorities. See id. at 685.
152. For another Justice Stevens dissenting opinion (also joined by Souter, J.) focusing
on the facts of the case and asserting that the state placed unduly broad restrictions on
First Amendment rights, see Burson v. Freeman, 504 U.S. 191, 217 (1992) (Stevens, J., dis-
senting) (holding that a prohibition of campaigning within 100 feet of a polling place does
not violate the First Amendment).
153. See Forbes, 523 U.S. at 686 n.6. The dissent noted that while the election in the
Third District was relatively close, in two of the other three districts in which both major
party candidates had been invited to debate, it was clear that one of them had little chance
of winning. See id. In the first district, the Democrat received 69.8% of the vote to the
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tice Stevens, commenting that the discretion of the government employ-
ees appeared limitless, argued that the same factors used to exclude
Forbes from the debate could also have been reasons to include him.'
Observing the results of the 1992 Third District election, the dissent
indicated that although Forbes may not have been able to win the elec-
tion, his past electoral success on the Republican ticket and inclusion in
the debate had the potential to help defeat the victorious Republican
candidate.' Stevens recognized the importance of debates on public is-
sues, especially in the conduct of campaigns for political office,5 6 and that
the majority's reliance on the subjective decisions of AETC employees in
its forum analysis revealed a failure to recognize the importance of the
candidate debate in the electoral process.' Finally, Justice Stevens
stated that the importance of avoiding arbitrary or viewpoint-based ex-
clusions from political debates "militates strongly in favor of requiring
the controlling state agency to use (and adhere to) pre-established, ob-
jective criteria" when determining participation in a debate.'58 In addi-
tion, the dissent stated that objective standards for exclusion would allow
government administrators to exclude candidates to further the viability
of a debate. 9
Republican's 30.2%, and in the second district, Democrat Thornton defeated Republican
Scott with 74.2% of the vote. See id. The dissent noted further that Scott had raised only
$6000 for his campaign, less than Forbes, yet Scott was invited to participate in the debate.
See id.
154. See id. at 692. The dissent also noted that although Forbes' lack of financial sup-
port arguably justified his exclusion, this factor could also have been a reason to include
him, enabling him to debate on a platform with wealthier candidates. See id. In a foot-
note, the dissent stated further that a lack of financial support apparently was not a factor
in AETC's decision to invite a major party candidate with even less financial support than
Forbes to a debate in another district. See id. at 686 n.6.
155. See id. at 685.
156. See id. at 693. (Stevens, J., dissenting) (quoting Monitor Patriot Co. v. Roy, 401
U.S. 265, 272 (1971), indicating that the First Amendment "'has its fullest and most urgent
application precisely to the conduct of campaigns for political office').
157. See id.
158. See id. at 694.
159. See id. at 694 n.19. This is not the first case in which Justice Stevens was con-
cerned about the unfettered discretion of public officials. In Frisby v. Schultz, 487 U.S.
474 (1988), Justice Stevens dissented on grounds that the scope of an ordinance prohibit-
ing picketing in front of private residences gave town officials too much discretion in en-
forcement. See Frisby, 487 U.S. at 499. The prohibition was aimed at preventing abortion
protests from taking place outside the homes of local doctors. See id. at 476. Justice Stev-
ens stated that although the town would probably only enforce the ordinance against hos-
tile picketing, the scope of the ordinance was overbroad and could be easily amended. See
id. at 499.
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III. AFFIRMING THE PREDOMINANCE OF THE TWO PARTY SYSTEM AT
THE EXPENSE OF THE INDEPENDENT CANDIDATES: THE RESULT OF
ARKANSAS EDUCATIONAL TELEVISION COMMISSION V. FORBES
In Forbes, the Court refused to stray from the traditional stance that
the journalistic decisions of broadcasters are best left unchallenged by
the judicial branch.' In rejecting the analysis of the Eighth Circuit that
the AETC debate was a public forum, the Court relied too heavily on the
stated intentions of AETC staff and ignored the characteristics of the
candidate debate as a forum for speech. Even if the debate were a non-
public forum, the Court failed to address in its opinion both that the con-
troversial nature of Forbes' views made his exclusion suspect and that
any exclusion of a candidate based solely on popularity would constitute
viewpoint discrimination.161 By failing to call for objective standards in
the debate context and ignoring the facts, the Court has further en-
trenched the duopoly in American politics and has silenced the minority
voice. 62
160. See Forbes, 523 U.S. at 673, 683. Instead, the Court has traditionally deferred to
the FCC and Congress to establish guidelines and to regulate the decisions of broadcast-
ers. See supra Part I.B (noting decisions of the Court in the broadcasting context).
161. The exclusion of Forbes was suspect both because of his lack of party affiliation
and his demonstrated bigotry; however, his exclusion flies in the face of Justice Holmes'
"Marketplace of Ideas" theory of First Amendment jurisprudence. Holmes stated that
"the best test of truth is the power of the thought to get itself accepted in the competition
of the market." Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 624 (1919) (Holmes, J., dissent-
ing). The decision of the Court in Forbes will now act to effectively shut independent and
controversial views out of that marketplace.
162. The controversy surrounding inclusion of third party and independent candidates
in debates is not likely to abate anytime soon. Studies now show that less than one-third
of young Americans identify with either major political party and 44% of voters aged 18 to
29 claim independent status. See Ted Halstead, A Politics for Generation X, ATLANTIC
MONTHLY, Aug. 1999, at 34. Many Americans fail to see any distinction between the two
parties and are instead opting for independent or third party candidates, as evidenced by
former wrestler Jesse "The Body" Ventura's election to the Governorship of Minnesota.
See id.; Steven F. Schier, Jesse's Victory: It Was No Fluke, WASH. MONTHLY, Jan. 1999, at
8. Governor Ventura ran as a Reform party candidate. See Schier, supra. The strongest
support for Ventura's candidacy in 1998 and Ross Perot's in 1992 came from young adults
who have become apathetic as a result of the infighting between the two major parties.
See id. In addition, candidates such as Patrick Buchanan, who leave the major parties for
third parties, understand the importance of appearing in a televised debate. See Ceci
Connolly, Politics, Quotable I, WASH. POST, Oct. 21, 1999, at A12. Buchanan, a long time
Republican and would-be Reform party presidential candidate said, "If I get into the race,
my determination will be to get into the debates, and if I get into a free-wheeling forum..
. I think I can become president of the United States .... " See id.
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A. By Allowing AETC to Reserve Access to the Debate Based on
Subjective Notions of Viability, AETC Was Able to Exclude Forbes
Because of His Controversial Views and Lack of Party Affiliation
In deciding whether the state has opened a designated public forum,
the Court has traditionally examined two factors: the intentions of the
state in establishing a forum for expressive activity and the characteristics
of the forum itself.' In Forbes, the Court's reliance on assertions of
AETC staff regarding the station's decision to host debates was inade-
quate to conclude that the debate was a nonpublic forum' 64
To determine whether a forum is a designated public forum or a non-
public forum, the Court first examines the intentions of the state in
opening the forum. 161 In Forbes, the Court held that AETC opened a fo-
163. See Perry Educ. Ass'n v. Perry Local Educators' Ass'n, 460 U.S. 37, 44-46 (1983)
(stating that an evaluation regarding access must be based on the character of the forum
and the intention of the government in allowing use of the property); see also Cornelius v.
NAACP Legal Defense & Educ. Fund, Inc., 473 U.S. 788, 803 (1985) (stating that the
Court will not find that a public forum exists when faced with evidence of contrary intent,
"nor will we infer that the government intended to create a public forum when the nature
of the property is inconsistent with expressive activity.").
164. See Forbes, 523 U.S. at 682-83. In 1992, AETC sponsored a series of four debates
in four different Arkansas congressional races. See id. at 670. In the other debates, candi-
dates with less objective support and financial resources were permitted access to the de-
bate, while Forbes was excluded from the Third District debate. See id. at 686 n.6 (Stev-
ens, J., dissenting). Forbes was a highly controversial candidate, who nevertheless, had a
great deal of support from the Third District in prior statewide races. See id. at 684.
AETC established a forum for candidates of the Third District, a class that included
Forbes. See id. at 693 n.18. As Justice Stevens noted in his dissent, when AETC opened
the debate to a class of "viable" or "newsworthy" candidates, as AETC claimed, it created
a designated public forum. See id. Once the state has opened a designated public forum,
any exclusion of a member of the class for which the forum was established must meet
strict scrutiny. See Cornelius, 473 U.S. at 800. The stated basis for exclusion of Forbes was
that he was not popular or politically viable in the judgment of the state employees. See
Forbes, 523 U.S. at 671.
Reliance on government employees for a decision on who is viable or popular is perilous
because Forbes' exclusion based on his viability, may have been merely a pretext for
viewpoint discrimination. Such discrimination cannot be used to exclude a member of a
class. See Perry, 460 U.S. at 45-46. Two years prior to the debate in question, Forbes ran
for Lieutenant Governor and carried 15 of 16 counties in the Third Congressional District.
See Forbes, 523 U.S. at 684-85. It seems suspect that a candidate could go from being
overwhelmingly popular in a district to "not politically viable" in a span of only two years.
Therefore, if the exclusion of Forbes was based on the subjective opinions of AETC staff,
that exclusion should have been ruled unconstitutional regardless of the type of forum be-
cause of the risk that the decision was motivated by animus towards Forbes' views.
165. See Widmar v. Vincent, 454 U.S. 263,267 (1981) (holding that by allowing student
groups to use its facilities, a university had created a forum generally open for use by stu-
dent groups). The Court ruled that the university could not then exclude a religious stu-
dent group from the facility because that group was a member of the class for which the
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rum for candidates of the Third District, but that AETC could then re-
serve eligibility for participation based on the assessment of "political vi-
ability" made by AETC staff.'66
The Court ignored the characteristics of the forum in its conclusion
that the debate was a nonpublic forum. 67 Similar to the university forum
in Widmar, an electoral debate has the characteristics of a forum estab-
lished for expressive activity, and is a prototype of the "marketplace of
ideas."' 6 In a debate, candidates share their views without intrusion
from the broadcaster in order to help the electorate determine which
candidate best represents their constituents' ideologies.' 69 Nevertheless,
in Forbes, after noting the importance of the candidate debate for its spe-
cial characteristics,' 70 the Court then ignored those characteristics in its
forum analysis.17' The Court over-relied on the stated intentions of
AETC and failed to examine the forum's characteristics in depth. As a
result, the Court erred in rejecting the Eighth Circuit's analysis that the
debate was a designated public forum12
forum was opened. See id. at 277. But see Perry, 460 U.S. at 47-49 (noting that the school,
by restricting access to its teachers mailboxes by outside groups, demonstrated the inten-
tion to prohibit general availability).
166. See Forbes, 523 U.S. at 680. The Forbes Court compared the debate to the char-
ity campaign in Cornelius, where the government made individualized assessments to de-
termine which agencies would participate in the campaign. See id.
167. Unlike the nonpublic fora of both Cornelius (federal charity campaign), and
Perry (teacher mailboxes), the forum at issue in Forbes had characteristics consistent with
a forum for speech activity. As was mentioned by both the majority and dissent through-
out the Forbes opinion, the debate is of central importance in the electoral process and is a
forum dedicated to the exchange of speech. See id. at 675-76, 692-94.
168. See Widmar, 454 U.S. at 267 n.5 (noting that a public university is not required to
grant free access to its facilities to both students and non-students alike). The university
setting, however, is a "marketplace of ideas" and any exclusion of a student group from an
area opened for expressive activity by students must meet strict scrutiny. See id.
169. See Forbes, 523 U.S. at 675. The Forbes Court noted that the debate is different
from a political talk show where the topics discussed are chosen, and the editors or host
can limit the conversation to those topics. See id.
170. See id. Candidate debate is of vital importance in any political race. Although
Jesse Ventura was without popular support in the race for Governor of Minnesota, op-
posing Democratic candidate "Skip" Humphrey insisted that Jesse Ventura be included in
each of 10 debates. See Schier, supra note 162, at 9. Humphrey's hope that Ventura, a
Reform Party candidate, would draw white males away from Humphrey's Republican op-
ponent backfired when Ventura came away from the debates as a popular alternative to
the staid political veterans of the major parties. See id. The push Ventura received from
the debates, as well as from Minnesota's campaign finance laws, helped Ventura pull a
stunning upset and become Governor of Minnesota. See id. at 8-9.
171. See Forbes, 523 U.S. at 676-77.
172. If the Court had held that the debate was a designated public forum, it is unlikely
that AETC would have met the "compelling state interest" test for exclusion from a public
forum. AETC argued that it had an interest in excluding Forbes in order to allow more
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B. Even if the Debate was a Nonpublic Forum, Forbes' Exclusion, Based
on a Subjective Assessment of Viability by State Employees, Was
Viewpoint Discrimination
The Court in Forbes held that although the state may exclude speakers
from a nonpublic forum, that exclusion must be reasonable in light of the
purpose of the property and may not be based on the views of the
speaker.'73 What the Forbes Court failed to recognize, however, was that
by excluding Forbes, AETC was engaging in viewpoint discrimination.
Exclusion from a forum based on subjective notions of viability pres-
ents an unreasonable risk that the exclusion is based on the speaker's
viewpoint rather than on viability because viability is akin to popular-
ity.17 4 Those candidates with unpopular views are less likely to be as vi-
able or popular as candidates with politically mainstream views; how-
ever, one cannot exclude a speaker from a forum based on the popularity
of his views. ' The exclusion of Forbes based on his subjective lack of
viability presents an unreasonable risk that his exclusion by the staff of
AETC was viewpoint discrimination.76 Several factors suggested that
AETC's reservation based on Forbes' viability was a mere pretext for his
exclusion, based actually on the unpopularity of his views.77 The major-
time for the two major party candidates to debate. See Joint Appendix of the Supreme
Court Record at 119, Arkansas Educ. Television Comm'n v. Forbes, 523 U.S. 666 (1998)
(No. 96-779). As stated in Rosenberger v. Rectors & Visitors of Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819,
835 (1995), the "government cannot justify viewpoint discrimination among private speak-
ers on the economic fact of scarcity." The Rosenberger Court further stated that the allo-
cation of scarce resources must be based on an acceptable neutral principle. See id. at 842-
44.
173. See Forbes, 523 U.S. at 682.
174. Although not addressed in the Forbes opinion, during oral argument Justice
Souter, who eventually sided with the dissent, asked counsel for AETC if the "newswor-
thy" standard used by AETC to exclude Forbes wasn't a "pretty darned good surrogate
for viewpoint discrimination?" "The viewpoint is unpopular," Souter concluded. Id. See
United States Supreme Court Official Transcript at 13-14, Arkansas Educ. Television
Comm'n v. Forbes, 523 U.S. 666 (1998) (No. 96-779).
175. See Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397, 414 (1989) (noting that "[i]f there is a bedrock
principle underlying the First Amendment, it is that the government may not prohibit the
expression of an idea simply because society finds the idea itself offensive or disagree-
able.").
176. See Forbes, 523 U.S. at 686 (Stevens, J., dissenting). In his dissent, Justice Stevens
noted the AETC's viewpoint discrimination when he concluded that the Eighth Circuit
"correctly concluded that the staffs appraisal of 'political viability' was 'so subjective, so
arguable, so susceptible of variation in individual opinion, as to provide no secure basis for
the exercise of governmental power consistent with the First Amendment."' Id
177. See Robert Marquand, Which Candidates Get to Speak on TV?, CHRISTIAN SCL
MONITOR, Oct. 9, 1997, at 1, 14 (noting that Forbes is a former member of the Nazi party
and a white supremacist who managed the 1988 presidential campaign of fellow white su-
premacist, David Duke).
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ity, however, chose to rely solely on the stated assertions of AETC staff
as to its intentions in sponsoring the debate.178 The exclusion of Forbes
based on a flexible viability standard created the risk that his highly con-
troversial views and lack of party affiliation, in conjunction with a lack of
objective standards, caused his exclusion from the debate. 9
In addition, by deciding to hold a debate and then limit participation to
Democrats and Republicans, regardless of election success, AETC en-
gaged in viewpoint discrimination.'" As was noted in the Amicus Brief
of Perot '96, Democrats outnumber Republicans nearly 3-1 in the First
Congressional District of Arkansas;"' yet, the Republican candidate was
not required to pass a "viability" test for inclusion in the debate.' In the
first district and in other districts in Arkansas as well, any per se qualifi-
cation of a Republican candidate as viable is questionable, but AETC in-
cluded the Republican candidates and excluded Forbes based on his "vi-
ability.""' The exclusion of Forbes was suspect not only because his
views were controversial, but because, as an independent candidate, he
was not politically mainstream.8' Regardless of the forum, the exclusion
of Forbes should have been unconstitutional as viewpoint discrimina-
178. See Forbes, 523 U.S. at 682.
179. See id. at 692 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (noting that the "viability" standard em-
ployed by AETC raised serious concerns about the reasons for Forbes' exclusion and the
unbridled discretion of AETC staff in controlling access to the debate); see also supra note
174 (noting Justice Souter's question at oral argument implying that a "newsworthy" stan-
dard was merely a surrogate for viewpoint disrimination).
180. In her testimony at trial, AETC director Susan Howarth testified that AETC de-
cided to include only the candidates who had a chance of winning the election. See Joint
Appendix of the Supreme Court Record at 118. Yet, AETC staff chose to include Re-
publican Dennis Scott in another 1992 congressional debate, even though Scott had raised
less money than Forbes and was a "'long-shot' who "'filed at the last minute to run, say-
ing [']no incumbent should get a free ride.[']" See Brief of Amicus Curiae Perot '96 at 12,
Arkansas Educ. Television Comm'n v. Forbes, 523 U.S. 666 (1998) (No. 96-779) [hereinaf-
ter Perot Brief].
181. See Perot Brief, supra note 180, at 12.
182. See id.
183. See id. The Perot '96 Brief notes that the debate sponsored by AETC in the first
district of Arkansas illustrates the double standard of assumed viability. See id. at 11.
"The First District of Arkansas is one of the most Democratic districts in the country and
has not sent a Republican Representative to the House since 1868." Id Therefore, the
Perot brief argues, any test of viability based on chances of winning would exclude the
Republican candidate. See id. at 12.
184. See id. at 11 (arguing that AETN's viability test was a pretext for political view-
point discrimination because it was not used to screen major party candidates who had no
chance of winning). The Court has noted that the interests of independent candidates are
not likely to be addressed adequately by legislatures, and that the risk of those groups'
First Amendment rights being violated "may warrant careful judicial scrutiny." Anderson
v. Celebrezze, 460 U.S. 780, 793 n.16 (1983).
Catholic University Law Review [Vol. 49:613
tion"' Therefore, even if the debate was a nonpublic forum, the Court
should have held that the exclusion of Forbes was not a reasonable,
viewpoint-neutral exercise of journalistic discretion.
C. The Court Should Have Adopted the Dissent's Call for Objective
Standards to Insure Against Viewpoint Discrimination in the Debate
Context
Although the dissent did not argue that public broadcasters have a
constitutional obligation to include all candidates in a debate, it indicated
that the decision to exclude Forbes was standardless in character and
tantamount to a prior restraint on speech. 8 The majority should have
called for the establishment of nonpartisan objective criteria to prevent
future litigation regarding access and to give both the public and the can-
didates assurance that the government will not censor speech.'7
The Forbes Court should have held that the criteria used to exclude
Forbes was vague, ' and that AETC could not exclude a candidate with-
185. See R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 392 (1992) (stating that it is not per-
missible to "license one side of a debate to fight freestyle, while requiring the other to
follow Marquis of Queensberry rules"); see also Denver Area Educ. Telecomms. Consor-
tium, Inc. v. FCC, 518 U.S. 727, 770 (1996) (Stevens, J., concurring) (noting that "[i]f the
Government spared all speech but that communicated by Republicans from the control of
the cable operator, for example, the First Amendment violation would be plain").
186. See Arkansas Educ. Television Comm'n v. Forbes, 523 U.S. 666, 684 (1998)
(Stevens, J., dissenting) ("The ad hoc decision of the staff of [AETC] raises ... concerns
addressed by 'the many decisions of this Court ... that a law subjecting the exercise of
First Amendment freedoms to the prior restraint of a license, without narrow, objective,
and definite standards to guide the licensing authority, is unconstitutional."') (quoting
Shuttlesworth v. Birmingham, 394 U.S. 147,150-51 (1969)).
187. See Kay v. Mills, 490 F. Supp. 844, 852 (E.D. Ky. 1980) (stating that unduly vague
laws deprive a court of the ability to scrutinize the potentially discriminatory decisions of
public officials).
188. In Hynes v. Mayor of Oradell, 425 U.S. 610 (1976) the court struck down for
vagueness an ordinance that required solicitors to obtain a permit before they canvassed
neighborhoods. See id. at 623. The Court noted that the ordinance did not specify suffi-
ciently what solicitors must do in order to comply, nor did the ordinance provide standards
to guide the licensing authority. See id. at 621-22. Similarly, in Forbes, AETC had not es-
tablished pre-determined objective criteria for access to the debate in order to allow the
candidates to take actions that would qualify them for participation in the debate. See
Forbes, 523 U.S. at 670. The Hynes Court noted that "ambiguities" in the Oradell ordi-
nance gave police "effective power to grant or deny permission to canvass for political
causes." Hynes, 425 U.S. at 622. Therefore, the ordinance was held void for vagueness.
See id. In Forbes, the Court should have held that the term "political viability" was simi-
larly vague without pre-established qualifying standards to determine viability. AETC's
use of discretion in excluding Forbes was similar to the breadth of the Oradell ordinance
in that no written criteria existed and government employees were able to use subjective
judgment resulting in the exclusion of qualified candidates. See Forbes, 523 U.S. at 692
(Stevens, J., dissenting).
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out pre-established objective standards to guide public broadcasters in
debate access determinations."' The majority in Forbes expressed con-
cern that any imposition of standards would lead to less speech, not
more, because state owned broadcasters would decline to sponsor de-
bates for fear that sponsorship might entangle them in litigation.' 90 Al-
though this concern may be valid, the dissent noted that the decision to
allow a candidate access to a debate is at least as important as a decision
to grant a parade permit.'9' The establishment of objective criteria would
serve to recognize that importance.
As Justice Stevens pointed out, objective standards for access would im-
pose only a modest requirement on broadcasters, which would fall far
short of a duty to grant all applications for access.' 9' Objective criteria
would also assure the public that state owned broadcasters could not ex-
clude candidates based on a vague 93 or arbitrary basis.194
189. See Organization for a Better Austin v. Keefe, 402 U.S. 415, 419 (1971) (stating
that "[a]ny prior restraint on expression comes to this Court with a 'heavy presumption'
against its constitutional validity"); see also City of Lakewood v. Plain Dealer Publ'g Co.,
486 U.S. 750, 763 (1988) (stating that the "danger" of "content and viewpoint censorship
... is at its zenith when the determination of who may speak.., is left to the unbridled
discretion of a government official").
190. See Forbes, 523 U.S. at 681 (noting that a Nebraska Educational Television Net-
work cancelled a congressional debate based upon the Eighth Circuit's ruling in Forbes).
191. See Forbes, 523 U.S. at 693; see also Forsyth County v. Nationalist Movement, 505
U.S. 123, 131-33 (1992) (invalidating a parade permit ordinance that gave government
administrators unfettered discretion to vary the permit fee). The Forsyth Court struck
down the ordinance because it did not have adequate standards for the administrator to
apply. See id. at 131-33. The Court noted that there was nothing in the law that prevented
discrimination against some views by varying the permit fee. See id.
192. See Forbes, 523 U.S. at 694 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
193. See Duke v. Connell, 790 F. Supp. 50, 56 (D. R.I. 1992) (granting presidential
candidate and white supremacist David Duke an injunction preventing the Secretary of
State of Rhode Island from excluding Duke from its primary ballot). The court applied
the Hynes vagueness factors and found that (1) the ballot access statute was vague because
it stated that those attempting to gain access must be "generally recognized nationally" as
presidential candidates, without specifying by whom the candidates must be recognized,
(2) the statute failed to specify what a candidate must do in order to comply, (3) the stat-
ute permitted a state administrator unfettered discretion to determine whether Duke was
a presidential contender. See id. at 54.
194. Ballot access laws are likely to provide the most objective criteria for determining
candidate viability. See, e.g., Perot Brief, supra note 180, at 20-21 (stating that access laws
provide objective tests of viability, requiring "a finite number of signatures from real citi-
zens, a test that all candidates understand, that measures seriousness with precise num-
bers, and that the government can readily certify a candidate as having passed or failed.").
As evidenced by the experience of Forbes, any candidate that attempts to qualify for the
ballot must initially complete a rigorous test of his own viability. See Joint Appendix of
the Record of the Supreme Court at 84, Arkansas Educ. Television Comm'n v. Forbes,
523 U.S. 666 (1998) (No. 96-779), Direct Examination of Ralph Forbes, at 84 (Forbes testi-
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Forbes' views may be odious and out of the political mainstream, but
he is still entitled to free speech as guaranteed by the First Amend-
ment.9 For candidates such as Forbes who lack the necessary financial
resources, media attention, and large-scale organization required to op-
erate a successful campaign, access to a forum like the one created by the
AETC is crucial.' 96 The important fact in debate access claims is not
whether the candidate has the ability to win, but whether prejudice will
result from a candidate's exclusion.' 97 Although many of these candi-
dates have slim chances of winning, they have significant potential to af-
fect election outcomes. 98 Inclusion of a range of voices in the election
context is necessary to assure that the promise of the First Amendment is
fulfilled.' 99
fied that the best one could hope for was between 20 to 30 signatures per hour, so that it
would usually take him 10 to 12 hours a day just to get a few hundred signatures).
195. See, e.g., Anderson v. Celebrezze, 460 U.S. 780, 794 (1983) (stating that "limiting
the opportunities of independent [I voters... threaten[s] to reduce diversity and competi-
tion in the marketplace of ideas").
196. Ironically, in 1998, AETN invited Ralph Forbes to a debate against Republican
Congressman Asa Hutchinson for the Third District seat. See Across the USA: News From
Every State, USA TODAY, Sept. 4, 1998, at 8A. Forbes was running under the flag of the
Reform Party, and he had a slim chance of defeating Hutchinson, a member of the power-
ful House Judiciary Committee. The election of Jesse Ventura as Governor of Minnesota
is a signal that many Americans are fed up with a two-party system that looks more like a
two headed monster. See Halstead, supra note 162, at 34. As a result of the Court's deci-
sion in Forbes, for an independent candidate to qualify for inclusion in a debate sponsored
by the government, one must be either independently wealthy or a celebrity. In discussing
the possibility of his candidacy for president in 2000, Warren Beatty echoed the sentiments
of many when he said "The political system is so corrupted, we don't really need a third
party. We need a second one." Walter Kirn, President Bulworth; He's musing about the
job. Don't laugh yet, TIME, Aug. 23, 1999, at 35.
197. See Fulani v. Brady, 935 F.2d 1324, 1331 (D.C. Cir. 1991). Dr. Fulani claimed that
the Commission on Presidential Debates (CPD) excluded her from a debate because she
was not a candidate with a realistic chance of winning. See id. at 1326. The majority held
that Fulani lacked standing because her injury was not traceable to the actions of CPD.
See id. at 1331. In his dissent, Chief Judge Mikva stated that the exclusion of Fulani un-
dermined her credibility with an electorate that could not understand why she had been
excluded, thereby casting doubt on her veracity. See id. at 1332. Chief Judge Mikva ar-
gued that such injury justified Article III standing under existing precedents. See id. Al-
though Forbes seemingly had little chance of winning the election, his exclusion from an
opportunity at free television access may have hampered his ability to affect the outcome
of the race.
198. See Perot Brief, supra note 180, at 19 (hypothesizing that based on Third District
election results, if Forbes had converted one in every 15 of Hutchinson's voters, the elec-
tion would have gone to Van Winkle); see also Bennett J. Matelson, Note, Tilting the
Electoral Playing Field: The Problem of Subjectivity in Presidential Election Law, 69
N.Y.U. L. REv. 1238, 1279 (1994) (noting that subjectivity creates unfair barriers for inde-
pendent candidates and that courts often do not recognize that many minor party candi-
dates run for reasons other than winning).
199. "The First Amendment... 'presupposes that right conclusions are more likely to
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IV. CONCLUSION
The Court in Forbes began its analysis by noting the importance of the
candidate debate in American politics. In determining that the debate
was a nonpublic forum, however, the Court ignored objective criteria as
well as the characteristics of the debate as a pure marketplace of ideas,
both of which supported finding that the debate was a designated public
forum. The Forbes decision confirms the Court's reluctance to intrude
into the decisions of broadcasters outside the realm of governmental
regulation. In addition, the Court failed to recognize the possibility that
any exclusion based on an individual's popularity could have been mere
pretext for viewpoint discrimination. By establishing or calling for the
use of objective standards for public broadcasters in the candidate debate
context, the Court could have provided more tangible guidelines to de-
termine whether the broadcaster discriminated based on the speaker's
views. Instead, the Court conformed to the American political duopoly
and effectively made it easier to silence the voices of under-financed
fledgling minority views in the future.
be gathered out of a multitude of tongues, than through any kind of authoritative selec-
tion."' New York Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 270 (1964) (quoting United States v. As-
sociated Press, 52 F. Supp. 362, 372 (S.D.N.Y. 1943)). In the words of Judge Learned
Hand, "'To many this is, and always will be, folly; but we have staked upon it our all."' Id.
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